What I Learned the Day My Company Went Into Administration
The hardest day of my professional life taught me something I couldn’t have learned any other way.
The day my company entered insolvency proceedings, I sat on a bench outside Crystal Palace Park and thought about nothing.
My mind was blank. Not from grief — from sheer disorientation. What had happened was too absurd to fully process.
What Happened
It was the second year of Lightopia Festival at Crystal Palace. The first year had been extraordinary — huge attendance, strong media, one of the best events we’d ever produced. We went back bigger.
We’d invested several million pounds. We’d invited over a hundred media outlets to the opening ceremony. Ticket sales were live. The Chinese Embassy’s cultural counsellor was confirmed for the launch.
On the second day of the festival, the park management informed us that the four tall mast floodlights at the National Sports Centre — which sat adjacent to our installation — had been identified as a structural safety risk. The area beneath them needed to be cordoned off immediately.
That zone covered the centrepiece of the entire festival. A massive, intricately designed dinosaur lantern installation — the visual heart of everything we’d built that year.
No advance warning. No compensation mechanism in the contract we’d signed.
The requests for refunds started coming in within hours. The media coverage turned. Two weeks of enforced closure. A cash flow crisis that couldn’t be recovered from.
The company went into administration.
The Question I Kept Asking
Sitting on that bench, I turned the same question over and over: Where did it go wrong?
The easy answer was bad luck. Structural faults in a building we didn’t own, in a park we’d trusted. An act of God. Not our fault.
That’s partly true.
But I needed a more honest answer than that. As the person who built the product, I needed to ask: what could I have controlled that I didn’t?
Three Failures in Product Design
First: I had no contingency for the collapse of the central experience.
I had designed the entire visual and emotional climax of the festival around a single zone in a space I didn’t fully control. The whole product’s value proposition rested on one element — and I had no Plan B if that element was unavailable.
That’s a product design failure. A well-designed experience has resilience built in. If the centrepiece becomes inaccessible, what’s the backup experience? What can you offer instead?
I hadn’t asked that question.
Second: All my risk was concentrated in one event.
If I had been running three cities simultaneously, the Crystal Palace loss would have been painful — but absorbable. The cash flow from the other cities would have provided cover.
At that point, we were single-site. Every pound of exposure was in one place.
Risk concentration is a structural business problem, not a run-of-luck problem. It’s something you design out.
Third: I misunderstood what a contract protects.
Contracts protect processes. They define who does what, and when. They’re remarkably bad at protecting experiences.
I had signed an agreement with the park. But I hadn’t written into that agreement: if a change by the venue makes it impossible to deliver the experience we’ve sold tickets for, here’s how we’re compensated and here’s the remediation process.
That clause doesn’t exist unless you put it there. I didn’t put it there.
What Sitting on That Bench Actually Taught Me
When the company folded, the conventional wisdom was that I should step away from cultural events. Try something lower-risk. Rebuild slowly in a safer sector.
Instead, I spent two years moving between China, the UK, and Europe, thinking through one question:
What would a cultural product need to look like to survive real market conditions?
Not what would make it beautiful. Not what would make it award-winning. What would make it structurally viable — so that when the unexpected happens (and it always happens), the project continues.
The answer wasn’t simpler events. The answer was a more rigorous design methodology.
Clear product logic. Controlled experience architecture. A commercial model with multiple legs, none of them load-bearing alone.
That thinking eventually became CAAP™ — Culture As A Product.
Failure Has Value With One Condition
Failure is only useful if you can identify exactly where you failed.
“Bad luck” is not a diagnosis. It might be part of the story, but it can’t be the whole story — because if it is, there’s nothing to learn and nothing to improve.
The diagnosis I came out of Crystal Palace with:
– Fragile product design
– Risk over-concentration
– Contractual gaps around experience delivery
Those were specific. Fixable. And they became the foundation of everything I built next.
When I stood up from that bench and bought a train ticket back to London, I wasn’t moving on. I was starting to work.
Ian Xia is the founder of Xiangvision (英伦大像), Lightopia Festival, and the CAAP™ Culture As A Product system. The company he built after that bench became the basis for a fifteen-city operation serving 2.65 million visitors.
